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P2P networks challenges
Advantages
• Decentralized systems: no infrastructure
cost, good scalability and robustness
• Allow millions of users to share files
Limits
• No central control & autonomous users:
P2P networks are a support to spread ma-
licious files (paedophilia, malware...)
• Normal users can access to malicious con-
tents unintentionally (pollution)
Objectives
• Monitor paedophile activities
• Monitor and act on malicious contents
The KAD network
KAD is used by eMule to index and retrieve the files shared by the users (∼ 3 millions). Unlike
eDonkey or Bittorrent, it is fully distributed: no central component knows "who is sharing what".
KAD uses a specific architecture called Distributed Hash Table and a double indexation mecha-
nism. Each participant is responsible of a part of the overall indexation of contents.
- Peers, Files and Keywords share the same
address space (2128). The tolerance zone defines
which peers index what contents, regarding their
KADID.
- Each file shared by a peer is published in two
steps:
• Each Keyword composing the filename is
linked to the File (Publish Keyword request)
• Each File is linked to the Peer sharing it
(Publish Source request)
- Searching for a file uses similar Search requests.
Technical difficulties
Monotoring users activity or controlling
contents in a P2P network are difficult tasks:
- To keep the information available, each file
and keyword is published on dozens of peers.
- Monitoring only files can lead to false pos-
itive (normal users considered as paedophiles).
- Attracting users with Honeypots (fake files)
is resource consuming: popular files need to
show a high number of sources.
- Recent protection mechanisms inserted in
KAD mitigate the Sybil attack (insertion of
many fake peers from a single computer to dis-
turb the network).
Our solution: a specific Honeynet architecture
HAMACK (Honeynet Architecture for Monitoring content ACcess in KAD), relies on 2 properties:
• The weakness of KAD allowing to freely choose
the place of a peer in the network
• The lookup algorithm used to find the peers re-
sponsible for a content: KAD always publishes
the content on the closest peers possible.
We proved that placing 20 Honeypeers
closer that any other peer to a given file or
keyword allows to control it.
HAMACK features against malicious contents
• Passive monitoring: attract all
Publish & Search requests, store
them in database, answer normally.
• Eclipsing content: attract all Pub-
lish & Search requests, deny Search
responses.
• Index poisoning: attract all Pub-
lish & Search Keyword requests,
answer with generated files.
• Promoting Honeypots: attract all
Publish & Search Source requests,
answer with Honeypeers.
• Discover the new published
malicious files for a given key-
word & the peers sharing a file.
• Remove the malicious con-
tent from the network: prevent
users from accessing it.
• Announce very attractive fake
files showing a high number of
sources.
• Attract the final download re-
quests for our generated files.
By attracting all the publications and searchs of a particular malicious con-
tents, HAMACK can assess and control users behavior from the initial search
of keyword to the final download.
Experiments on the real network
Performance evaluation:
(see paper)
• Number of probes,
probes configuration
• Load distribution
• Number of replicated
requests captured...
Controlling access to real contents:
We eclipsed the good references for the keyword "spiderman" and
poisoned them with 4 fake files.
The 2 fake files announced with a high
number of sources received much more
download requests from users. It shows
the importance to control the DHT to
build an efficient Honeypot to attract
users.
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